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JEFFREY W. STEMPEL* 
INTRODUCTION 
In Schmidt v. Smith,! the New Jersey Supreme Court caught 
more than a few observers by surprise.2 New Jersey courts have 
generally issued opinions regarded as pro-claimant and pro-policy­
holders.3 But everyone's taste for recompense and coverage has 
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las 
Vegas. This commentary is in part an outgrowth of a presentation on "Emerging Cov­
erage Issues" delivered at the Professional Liability Underwriters Symposium, EPLI 
and the Changing Workplace (Mar. 2, 1999 in New York) and other writings on employ­
ment claims. See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES Ch. 
21 (2d ed. 1999); JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, Recent Case Developments, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 
489 (1998). Special thanks to Jeff Klenk, Jay Mootz, and other Symposium participants, 
Mara Levy for research assistance, as well as to Ann McGinley, Ken Vinson, and Dean 
Dick Morgan. 
1. 713 A.2d 1014 (N.J. 1998). 
2. See, e.g., David F. McGonigle, Recent Developments: Employment Discrimina­
tion/Harassment Claims Under EL Policies: Schmidt v. Smith, J. INS. COVERAGE, vol. 1, 
no. 1, at 94 (1998) (discussing the case without overt criticism but clearly treating the 
decision as important and suggesting it represents a new and unexpected development 
for insurance coverage law); Susanne Sclafane, N.J. Harassment Ruling Roils WC Mar­
ket, NAT'L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CAS. RISK & BENEFITS MGMT., Apr. 5, 1999, at 16 
(noting that after the decision there was an "initial outcry by insurers" that it "would 
send workers' compensation premiums soaring" and treating the decision as surprising 
and a major fissure in the structure of insurance coverage packages typically offered for 
commercial risks, but quoting industry sources that the impact of the decision may be 
slower and less drastic than first envisioned by insurers); Daniel Hays, N.J. WC Rocked 
by Sex Ruling, NAT'L UNDERWRITER PRoP. & CAS. RISK & BENEFITS MGMT., June 29, 
1998, at 4 (same); Comp Policy Covers Harassment Defense, Bus. INS., July 13, 1998, at 
10 (treating the ruling as surprising and threatening to existing combination of workers' 
compensation and employers' liability claims). 
3. See, e.g., Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831 
(N.J. 1993) (finding that, linguistically, the qualified pollution exclusion bars coverage 
for pollution claims against policyholder, but that representations of insurers to regula­
tors made in connection with approval of the exclusion require insurer to provide cov­
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limits. 
In Schmidt, the court exceeded those limits for many observers 
by holding that despite what it regarded as clear contract language 
in an exclusion, an insurer providing Employers' Liability ("EL") 
coverage along with Workers' Compensation ("WC") insurance for 
the employer was required to provide coverage in a case of blatant 
sexual harassment bordering on criminal assault. In doing so, the 
Schmidt court, however laudable its motives, pushed doctrines of 
reasonable expectations of coverage, public policy, and statutory in­
terpretation further than was necessary or wise. 
Although the net result of the decision may be salutary to the 
degree it provides greater recompense for victims of sexual harass­
ment and other discriminatory injury in the workplace, Schmidt v. 
Smith remains a troubling episode of judicial enthusiasm for man­
dated coverage.4 Although the workers' compensation realm of 
law imposes more coverage responsibilities upon employers and in­
surers, the nature of the underlying claim and the clarity of the ex­
clusion should have received greater attention by the court. 
Notwithstanding the statutory framework of the workers' compen­
sation law, the Schmidt v. Smith decision was not as compelled as 
the court suggests. Certainly, traditional means of contract and 
statutory construction do not support mandating coverage and it is 
erage so long as discharge of contaminant was not intentional, even if release of 
pollutant was gradual rather than abrupt); SL Indus., Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. 
Co., 607 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992) (adopting a subjective approach to intentional injury 
defense; setting forth principles of apportionment of insurer and policyholder responsi­
bility for covered and uncovered claims); Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 
1255 (N.J. 1992) (holding that emotional injury constitutes "bodily injury" under insur­
ance policy, so long as accompanied by some physical manifestation); Sparks v. St. Paul 
Ins. Co., 495 A.2d 406 (N.J. 1985) (finding that the claims-made policy was not uncon­
scionable as a genre of insurance product, but imposing certain requirements for use of 
form); Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 405 A.2d 788 (N.J. 1979) (finding that there was 
no coverage under liability policy for a claim of customer dissatisfaction over subpar 
quality of construction work); Harr v. Allstate Ins. Co., 255 A.2d 208 (N.J. 1969) (apply­
ing reasonable expectations approach to hold that homeowner's coverage for flooding 
of home office was not barred by business pursuits exclusion); Kievit v. Loyal Protec­
tive Life Ins. Co., 170 A.2d 22 (N.J. 1961) (applying reasonable expectations approach 
to find coverage despite exclusion). 
4. The term is Professor Kenneth Abraham'S, taken from his article, Judge-Made 
Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations o/the Insured, 
67 VA. L. REv. 1151, 1162-63 (1981), from which the term "judge-made insurance" is 
also borrowed. Professor Abraham used both terms to refer to a category of insurance 
coverage decisions where despite little textual guidance-or even clear contrary lan­
guage-courts found coverage for policyholders out of a belief that the insurance policy 
in question should provide such coverage in light of the nature of the policy and the 
context of the claim. 
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by no means clear that mandated coverage is the public policy "an­
swer" to the dilemma faced by the Schmidt court.S 
In addition, the court's approach on behalf of policyholders 
and claimants borrows from the suspect jurisprudential approach of 
reading policy language with great literalism and making sweeping 
pronouncements regarding wrongdoing and public values.6 In re­
cent years, insurers have often been the litigants advocating this ex­
treme form of contract or statutory construction. Take perhaps the 
most extreme recent example: general liability insurers have fre­
quently (and with more success than they deserve) invoked the lin­
guistic breadth of the "absolute pollution exclusion" to deny 
coverage for claims involving lead paint poisoning, carbon monox­
ide poisoning, and workplace accidents that incidently involve 
chemicals, even though such denials extend well beyond the under­
standing of the exclusion held by reasonable persons with the most 
fervent commitment to hyperliteralism.7 In addition, these insurers 
frequently seek to make a morality play of insurance coverage liti­
gation: policyholders (the same policyholders to whom the insurer 
owes a near fiduciary relationship) are demagogically deemed "pol­
luters," obvious bad guys who should be stripped of the insurance 
5. See infra notes 45-74 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for lack of 
compelling case for mandating Employers' Liability Insurance ("ELI") coverage of sex­
ual harassment claims). Regarding the mandatory nature of we insurance coverage 
and its differences from conventional liability insurance, see ARlHUR LARSON & LEX 
K. LARSON, 9 LARSON'S WORKERS' CoMPENSATION § 92 (1999). 
6. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet Expectations: Undue Restriction of the Reason­
able Expectations Approach and the Misleading Mythology of Judicial Role, 5 CoNN. 
INS. L.J. 181,245-77 (1998) (criticizing textual literalism as a school of contract interpre­
tation and advocating a reasonable role for factors of intent, purpose, and expectation 
in construing contracts); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reason and Pollution: Correctly Constru
ing the "Absolute" Exclusion in Context and in Accord with its Purpose and Party Ex
pectations, 34 TORT & INs. LJ. 1, 7-17, 33-35, 58-59 (1998) (reviewing basic contract 
principles and concluding that mainstream contract construction is not literalist or re­
stricted solely to dictionary analysis of text; criticizing certain insurers for attempting to 
tum contract litigation into a "morality play" about whether policyholder is a bad "pol­
luter"); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unreason in Action: A Case Study of the Wrong 
Approach to Construing the Liability Insurance Pollution Exclusion, 50 FLA. L. REv. 
463 (1998) (criticizing Florida Supreme Court's formal and hyperliteral application of 
pollution exclusion to bar coverage for claims against an architectural firm when a 
blueprint machine overturned and spilled ammonia). 
7. See Stempel, Reason and Pollution, supra note 6, at 1-5; William P. Shelley & 
Richard e. Mason, Application of the Absolute Pollution Exclusion to Toxic Tort 
Claims: Will Courts Choose Policy Construction or Deconstruction?, 33 TORT & INS. 
L.J. 749-50 n.1 (listing cases where pollution exclusion defense was not successful for 
toxic tort claims) & n.2 (listing cases where pollution exclusion was held to bar such 
"toxic tort" claims, or claims where chemicals were involved). 
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coverage they thought they were buying.s 
Despite the different nature of the coverage disputes, the 
Schmidt v. Smith decision mirrors, to a significant degree, the errors 
of insurers and sympathetic courts that have over-applied the pollu­
tion exclusion. In both types of coverage disputes, the courts have 
made· an overbroad application of the exclusion. Specifically, III 
Schmidt v. Smith: 
• Language is read hyperliterally rather than with sufficient ap­
preciation of background, context, and purpose of the insuring 
agreement; 
• Public policy preferences are turned into mandates that over­
ride other indicia of contract meaning; and 
• An unanticipated result obtains, one at odds with the expecta­
tions of at least several interested parties, in this instance the 
insurer, the industry, and probably the employer and regula­
tors as well. 
Compared to the toxic tort cases, which deny coverage because 
of the pollution exclusion, Schmidt v. Smith at least has the redeem­
ing value of extending rather than constricting coverage, enhancing 
the prospects for compensation of harassment and discrimination 
victims, and imposing burdens on actors well suited to risk-bearing 
and risk-spreading for profit. On the other hand, coniractenforce­
ment and reliance interests take something of a beating in Schmidt. 
Methodologically, the decision follows an interpretative fork that 
one hopes is not a harbinger of future judicial action even though 
the net impact of the decision may not be negative.9 
8. See Stempel, Reason and Pollution, supra note 6, at 33-35, 58-59 (criticizing 
certain insurers for attempting to turn contract litigation into a "morality play" about 
whether policyholder is a bad "polluter"). 
9. By contrast, I find no such silver lining in the decisions that construe the pollu­
tion exclusion too broadly. See generally Stempel, Reason and Pollution, supra note 6; 
Stempel, Unreason in Action, supra note 6. In the cases erroneously treating common­
place liability claims as excluded "pollution," the policyholder is deprived of coverage 
on which it relied, but the insurance industry, risk managers, and the public register no 
comparable gain through the development of more affordable insurance or sounder risk 
pools. Rather, a few insurers at certain fortuitous junctures obtain episodic relief from 
their contract obligations, leading to modestly greater profits for the insurer that are 
diluted and circulated to shareholders or consumed by constituents of the corporate 
entity. In short, there is, to use the Supreme Court's memorable phrase from Ginzburg 
v. United States, 383 u.S. 463, 478 n.2 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting) and other cases 
involving regulation of sexually explicit materials, "no redeeming social value" to the 
overly broad and literal application of the pollution exclusion. By contrast, there may 
be some positive aspects of Schmidt v. Smith despite the current dread it induces in 
WCIEL insurers. See infra notes 43-58 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE SCHMIDT V. SMITnlO LITIGATION 
Lisa Schmidt filed a complaint against her employer, Personal­
ized Audio Visual, Inc. ("PAV"), and its president, Dennis Smith, 
alleging hostile work environment sexual harassment in violation of 
the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("LAD"), assault, bat­
tery, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional dis­
tress.ll In an amended complaint, she also alleged liability for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress against Smith and negli­
gent failure to train supervisors against PAV.12 
PAY and Smith sought defense and indemnity coverage from 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty ("USF&G") under a Compre­
hensive General Liability ("CGL") policy and later under an Em­
ployer's Liability ("EL") policy.B USF&G denied coverage under 
both policies.14 The trial of the discrimination action preceded the 
trial of the coverage dispute. IS USF&G had the opportunity to par­
ticipate in the defense, but refused.16 At trial, the jury found Smith 
liable for hostile work environment, sexual harassment, assault, bat­
tery, and intentional infliction of emotional distressP The jury 
found PAY liable only for hostile work environment sexual harass­
ment.18 The verdict form did not ask whether the employer's liabil­
ity was direct or. vicarious or whether the employer might be 
vicariously liable for the intentional torts committed by Smith.19 
After the jury verdict, the trial court found that USF&G was 
responsible for coverage.20 The intermediate appellate court af­
firmed the trial court's verdict and found that PAY's EL policy pro­
vided coverage even though its CGL policy did not.21 The New 
Jersey Supreme Court affirmed this result, but rejected in part the 
reasoning of the appellate court.22 The supreme court concluded 
10. 713 A.2d 1014 (N.J. 1998). 
11. See id. at 1015-16. 
12. See id. at 1016. 
13. See id. 
14. See id. 
15. See id. 
16. See id. 
17. See id. 
18. See id. 
19. See id. 
20. See id. 
21. See id. (stating that the exclusion in the employer's liability coverage of the 
WC policy was not applicable to sexual harassment claims when liability for those 
claims was imposed vicariously); see also Smith v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 
684 A.2d 66,73-74 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1996). 
22. See Schmidt, 713 A.2d at 1018. 
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that the language of the CGL policy did in fact operate to exclude 
employment discrimination claims, but also held that such coverage 
was statutorily required by state law requiring employers to make 
arrangements for coverage of any bodily injury incurred by 
workers.23 
The EL policy in question stated that it covered damages ac­
cruing to the employer for occurrences of "'bodily injury by acci­
dent or bodily injury by disease,' which arises 'out of and in the 
course of the injured employee's employment' by the insured."24 
However, the EL policy also contained an exclusion for damages 
"arising out of coercion, demotion, evaluation, reassignment, disci­
pline, defamation, harassment, humiliation, discrimination against 
or termination of any employee, or any personnel practices, poli­
cies, acts or omissions."25 
The court found the broad language of this exclusion was tex­
tually applicable in the Schmidt claim because the damages for 
which PAY was liable were damages "arising out of" harassment.26 
However, the court also found that the exclusion could not be en­
forced against PAVor Smith because the exclusion was inconsistent 
with New Jersey law that requires employers to "make sufficient 
provision for the complete payment of any obligation [the em­
ployer] may incur to an injured employee."27 
Specifically, the supreme court held that because Schmidt's 
claim was based in part on a finding of negligence by the employer 
and supervisor,28 her injuries were of the type for which bodily in­
jury coverage for workplace mishaps was mandated by state stat­
ute.29 Consequently, application of the harassment exclusion in the 
EL policy to Schmidt's injuries resulting from negligence violated 
New Jersey law and was unenforceable (even though the negligent 
injury was related to or resulted in claims of harassment). 
23. See id. 
24. Id. at 1017 (citation omitted). 
25. Id. 
26. See id. at 1018. 
27. Id. at 1015 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-71 (West 1988». 
28. Although the jury did not specifically make a finding of negligence or vicari­
ous liability against the employer, neither did it foreclose negligence, which was 
pleaded by the plaintiff and on which evidence was presumably presented at trial. See 
id. at 1016. Although the court did not elaborate on this point, it implicitly concluded 
that the jury verdict must be viewed in the light most favorable to the employer policy­
holder, which argued that the verdict, although arguably ambiguous, was one based on 
negligence rather than intentional wrongdoing. 
29. See id. at 1018. 
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However, according to the supreme court, the harassment ex­
clusion would be enforceable to bar coverage for claims that did not 
fall within the statutorily mandated coverage for "accidental bodily 
injury" (bodily injury not intended by the employer even though 
other workers may have acted with intent to do harm). According 
to the Schmidt court, state law does not require the employer to 
provide coverage for claims that do not result in "bodily injury."30 
Thus, an insurer's use of an exclusion to bar coverage for the finan­
cial or reputational injury usually associated with "criticism, demo­
tion, evaluation, and defamation," would normally be enforceable 
since a policyholder "would not expect to be covered" in such cases, 
making the exclusion "valid as long as the liability arising from 
those discomforts is not related to bodily injury."31 
The Schmidt court held that in the instant case, the employer's 
liability was "primarily related to the personal injuries [the em­
ployee plaintiff] suffered as a result of [the supervisor's] conduct."32 
New Jersey law regards emotional injury accompanied by physical 
manifestation as "bodily injury" under liability insurance policies.33 
The New Jersey Supreme Court did not disturb the intermediate 
appellate holding that the employer's CGL policy, which included 
an employment-related injury exclusion, did not provide coverage. 
In another case decided the same day, American Motorists In­
surance Co. v. L-C-A Sales Co. ,34 the court also excluded coverage 
for harassment and wrongful termination claims under a standard 
CGL policy. That decision makes clear that Schmidt was based not 
on the specific language of the EL policy at issue, but on state law 
and public policy mandating minimum insurance coverage for bod­
ily injury to workers. American Motorists did not present these 
statutory and public policy considerations. In American Motorists, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court was faced with age discrimination 
and harassment claims made by a former employee of the policy­
holder.35 According to the court, the CGL's employment exclusion 
30. See id. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. See id.; see also Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1255 (N.J. 
1992). 
34. 713 A.2d 1007 (N.J. 1998). 
35. In American Motorists, John Piccialo had worked as a salesman for L-C-A 
Sales for more than thirty years, until his termination in 1991 at age 67. See id. at 100S. 
He sued, charging that he had been harassed into involuntary retirement because of his 
age. See id. L-C-A sought coverage for the Piccialo suit under its CGL. See id. The 
CGL contained the typical insuring agreement covering bodily injury claims against the 
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language barred coverage for the employee's age discrimination 
and harassment claims. 
The American Motorists court found the employment claims 
exclusion in the CGL to be broad, clear, and enforceable despite 
the general rule that it is the insurer's burden to demonstrate the 
applicability of the exclusion.36 A unanimous court found that this 
burden was met because the exclusion was "clear and unambigu­
ous," particularly given its location in the policy adjacent to an ex­
clusion for workers' compensation claims.37 According to the 
court, the plain language of the employment exclusion and its 
placement in the policy 
demonstrates that the objective of the CGL policy was to exclude 
from coverage all claims-whether falling within or beyond the 
workers' compensation system-"arising out of and in the course 
of" [Plaintiff's] employment. Were the employee exclusion inter­
preted only to bar coverage for workers' compensation claims, 
the workers' compensation exclusion in LCA's CGL policy 
would be redundant.38 
In addition, the court applied an expansive meaning to the ex­
clusion's "arising out of' language, and equated the term with 
"originating from," "growing out of," or "having a 'substantial 
nexus' with the activity for which coverage is provided."39 Conse­
quently, plaintiff's claim that he was harassed by telephone calls at 
home, as well as by actions at work, did not bring the claim within 
the CGL coverage. 
As evidenced by the juxtaposition of American Motorists and 
Schmidt, the Schmidt court recognized that the EL insurer had uti­
lized compellingly clear language excluding harassment and dis­
crimination coverage, but refused to enforce that clear language 
favoring the insurer because New Jersey state law requires the em­
ployer to provide coverage for any workplace-related bodily injury 
claims. In other words, the supreme court "rewrote" the insuring 
agreement to require the EL insurer to provide broader coverage to 
the employer. Effectively, the court created a new insuring agree­
ment of "judge-made insurance." 
policyholder and also contained the typical exclusionary language that there would be 
no coverage for bodily injury to "[a]n employee of the insured arising out of and in the 
course of employment by the insured." . Id. 
36. See id. at 1013. 
37. See id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 1010. 
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II. INTERPRETATIVE FACTORS IN CONSTRUING -INSURANCE 
POLICIES AND STATUTES 
Insurance policies are contracts and the ordinary rules of con­
tract interpretation apply to insurance coverage disputes. In addi­
tion, because of the technical nature of insurance, the structure of 
the insuring process, and the control over contract language typi­
cally exercised by insurers, conventional contract doctrines have 
been fine tuned under insurance law. Although courts and com­
mentators frequently refer to a divergence between "regular" con­
tract law and insurance law, insurance coverage litigation, like 
contract litigation, ordinarily turns on questions of textual interpre­
tation conducted in light of the intent of the parties, the purpose of 
the insurance policy at issue, the expectations of the parties, partic­
ularly the reasonable expectations of the policyholder, and the im­
pact of regulatory law and questions of public policy. Many of 
these same rules apply for interpreting legislative enactments or ad­
ministrative regulations. 
A. Text 
The text of the policy is the primary basis for construction of 
the policy and for decisions regarding coverage disputes.4o Where 
the text of an insurance policy is clear, admits of only one reason­
able meaning, and does not render an absurd result, a court ordina­
rily applies the text as written to decide the coverage question.41 
Where policy language is unclear, courts ordinarily consider other 
factors in determining meaning.42 However, under the long-stand­
ing contract principle of contra proferentem ("against the drafter"), 
ambiguous language is construed against the author of the policy, 
which is nearly always the insurer.43 Some courts invoke the contra 
proferentem principle against the insurer as soon as the court deter­
mines that the language at issue is ambiguous, but this is a minority 
view.44 Most courts first consider extrinsic evidence of meaning 
40. For general principles of contract interpretation and construction of insurance 
policies, see JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACf DISPUTES § 4.04 (2d 
ed.1999). 
41. See, e.g., National Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v. Karaganis, 811 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 
1987) (applying Illinois law); In re Celotex Corp., 175 B.R. 98 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (enforc­
ing broad asbestos exclusion in policy). . 
42. See STEMPEL, supra note 38, § 4.04, at 4-15. 
43. See id. § 4.08, at 4-57. 
44. See id. at 4-59 to 4-60. 
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before applying the contra proferentem tiebreaker.45 
B. Intent and Purpose 
The principal determinant of meaning, other then the policy 
text, is the intent of the parties. Many courts state that ascertaining 

. the intent of the parties and construing the policy accordingly is the 

chief judicial task. Therefore, the policy language has importance 

not because of its status as the content of the instrument, but be­

cause of its status as the most accurate embodiment of the intent of 

the parties.46 However, even courts that treat intent as the primary 

factor in contract interpretation usually will not consider extrinsic 

evidence of intent where the policy language is seemingly clear and 

sensible.47 
The purpose of the insurance policy48 combines with the intent 
of the parties49 to provide extrinsic evidence for resolving ambigu­
ous language and to guide the court in its determination of the 
meaning of the text of the insurance policy.50 Because intent and 
purpose are so closely related, there is a tendency among courts and 
commentators to collapse the two. This Article uses "intent" to 
connote the specific intent of the contracting parties in situations 
where the parties in fact had relatively specific expectations regard­
ing the meaning of certain terms and the resolution of potential 
claims thought likely to result. In contrast, the "purpose" of the 
insurance policy refers to the general function of the instrument 
and its role in the risk management of the policyholder. For exam­
ple, a policyholder may obtain CGL insurance to protect it from the 
third-party claims normally levied against businesses of that type. 
Thus, a restauranteur policyholder may not have a specific intent 
that her CGL will cover claims for illness caused by an exotic bacte­
ria or legionnaire's disease carried in the restaurant's ventilation 
system, but views the purpose of the CGL as providing coverage for 
claims if patrons allege that they became sick from eating in the 
restaurant. 
45. See id. at 4-60. 
46. See id. § 4.04, at 4-15. See, e.g., Price v. Zim Israel Navigation Co., 616 F.2d 
411, 422 (9th Cir. 1980) (applying California law). 
47. See ROBERT H. JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 25[b] (2d ed. 
1996). 
48. See STEMPLE, supra note 38, § 4.05. 
49. See id. § 4.04. 
50. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 
P.2d 641, 645 (Cal. 1968). 
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c. Reasonable Expectations 
Related to both purpose and intent is the concept of reason­
able expectations. As a consideration in contract interpretation, 
reasonable expectations have long played a role. For example, 
when policy language is unclear, courts normally give the language 
the construction that would be accorded it by a reasonable policy­
holder reader.51 During the past 30 years, the reasonable expecta­
tions concept in insurance law has been associated with the writings 
of Judge Robert Keeton who, as a Harvard Law School professor, 
enunciated in his scholarly writings a "reasonable expectations doc­
trine" that not only employed the reasonable expectations concept 
to construe doubtful policy language, but also posited that insur­
ance policies should be construed to effect the objectively reason­
able expectations of the policyholder, even in cases where 
"painstaking" analysis of the text of the policy would have negated 
those expectations. 52 
The expectations of policyholders as an interpretative tool has 
been utilized most often when clear contract language excluding 
coverage exists in the policy but is "hidden" or "confusing" or "de­
ceptive" because of its location in the policy. On relatively rare 
occasions the reasonable expectations concept has been invoked to 
overcome clear contract language that is not hidden or "sneaky," 
but would operate to negate an essential coverage function of the 
policy. 
D. Interpretative Groundrules of Statutory Construction 
Although a substantial commentary on statutory interpretation 
lies well beyond the scope of this Article, some comment on this 
body of law is required to appreciate the bold breadth of Schmidt v. 
Smith.53 Although courts and commentators have tended to treat 
the construction of statutes and insurance policies as two separate 
realms, there are many interpretative similarities. 
51. See STEMPEL, supra note 38, § 4.04 (discussing role of reasonable construction 
under traditional ground rules for contract construction); § 4.09 (discussing the reason­
able expectation doctrine applied as a specific school of insurance contract interpreta­
tion). See, e.g., Claussen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 676 F. Supp. 1571 (S.D. Ga. 1987), 
rev'd, 888 F.2d 747, 749 (11th Cir. 1989). For a further discussion of the reasonable 
expectations approach as a theory of insurance policy interpretation, see Stempel, Un
met Expectations, supra note 6, at 181 and Abraham, supra note 4, at 1151. 
52. See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provi­
sions Pan I, 83 HARv. L. REv. 961 (1970); Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at 
Variance with Policy Provisions Pan II, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1970). 
53. 713 A.2d 1014 (N.J. 1998). 
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Statutory interpretation of insurance law, while an area of 
greater debate and less doctrinal consistency than exists for con­
tracts, nonetheless resembles contract jurisprudence a great deal. 
The statutory text is very important, but is not interpreted literally 
or with excessive formalism and brittleness. Statutory language is 
the most important factor, but questions of specific legislative intent 
and general legislative purpose are also frequently utilized by 
courts to decide cases. 54 
E. 	 Comprehensive Approaches to Construction of Statutes and 
Insurance Policies 
To a degree, intent, purpose, and expectation overlap consider­
ably and commingle in influencing judicial interpretation of insur­
ance policy text. Although expectations analysis is typically viewed 
as focusing on the understanding of the policyholder, many cover­
age doctrines tending to favor insurers can be seen as part of the 
broader principle that the scope of policy coverage must be consis­
tent with the objectively reasonable expectations of both insurer 
and policyholder. For example, the principles that only "fortuitous" 
losses are covered55 and that a policyholder may not recover more 
than it has lost (the "indemnity" principle)56 need not be codified in 
the policy to be utilized to deny coverage to a policyholder who 
intentionally brought about a loss or who is seeking a duplicative 
recovery exceeding his own losses. In addition, the rule that a poli­
cyholder must have an insurable interest in the object of the insur­
ance57 could be regarded as another extension of the reasonable 
expectations doctrine favoring insurers. 
F. 	 Statutes, Regulation, and Public Policy 
Insurable interest and other aspects of insurance law may be 
54. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Rehnquist Court, Statutory Interpretation, Inertial 
Burdens, and a Misleading Version of Democracy, 22 U. ToL. L. REv. 583, 589 (1991) 
(reviewing major statutory interpretation approaches of textualism, intentionalism, and 
purposivism, as well as evolutive, pragmatic, and free inquiry approaches to construing 
statutes). 
55. See. STEMPEL, supra note 38, § 1.05[ a 1for a more detailed discussion of the 
fortuity principle. 
56. 	 See id. § 1.03 for a more detailed discussion of the indemnity principle. 
57. See id. § 1.04. The insurable interest doctrine provides that a policyholder 
cannot reasonably expect to obtain money for the loss of something in which he has no 
insurable interest. 
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substantially regulated by statute.58 Much of the regulatory appara­
tus surrounding insurance is addressed to the solvency of insurers, 
their investment behavior and financial strength, and to issues of 
marketing, consumer protection, and remedies for insurer misbe­
havior. Some state insurance regulation also involves construction 
of the insurance contract itself. In addition, courts may consult the 
overall regulatory scheme of insurance in deciding coverage ques­
tions and fashioning remedies. Courts may determine insurance 
coverage disputes based on public policy considerations drawn from 
the court's interpretation of the statutory scheme or derived from 
other statutes or the common law.59 
Judicial restriction of the reach of "unconscionable" contract 
terms can be seen as judicial decision-making decision based on 
public policy. Coupled with the statutory system of regulating in­
surance, each state has a department of insurance charged with ap­
plying the state insurance laws and empowered to promulgate and 
enforce regulations in that mission. Courts often take cognizance 
of the position of the insurance regulators on issues of public policy 
and construction of state statutes. 
III. SCHMIDT v. SMIT~: EXCEEDING REASONABLE 
EXPECI'ATIONS AND OVERMANDATING INSURANCE 
The array of insurance policy interpretive factors discussed 
above form a considerable arsenal for courts attempting to decide 
insurance coverage disputes. However, within this universe policy 
text is the first among equals regarding contract meaning and legal 
effect. Close behind is any specific understanding of each party's 
intent.60 The purpose of the policy and the expectations of the par­
ties are less overtly invoked as a basis of decision, but hold signifi­
cant importance in determining insurance disputes. Notions of 
public policy are generally used only in rare cases unless there is an 
express statutory or regulatory directive compelling a particular re­
sult. The restricted role of such public policy considerations stems 
58. See generally id., Ch. 2 (regarding government regulation of the insurance 
business and insurance product). 
59. See id. 
60. I also include much of the law of equitable estoppel and waiver (and even 
promissory estoppel) in this category. These doctrines, to a considerable degree, decide 
insurance disputes based on some notion of intent of at least one of the parties, usually 
the insurer, which has reflected an intent to do something for the policyholder, or to 
refrain from invoking a defense. For further discussion of waiver and estoppel, see 
STEMPEL, supra note 38, Ch. 5. 
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from the traditional Anglo-American view that courts should de­
cide cases by applying law and refrain from activity that smacks too 
much of "making" law or "judicial activism" based on the court's 
own notions of what is good or juSt.61 
The Schmidt v. Smith62 decision comes as a surprising and dis­
orienting decision in large part because, despite clothing itself in the 
language of a statutory "command," it creates coverage extending 
considerably beyond what appears to have been actually contem­
plated by either insurers or others involved in the relevant mar­
ket.63 Schmidt v. Smith is one of those rare cases that (at least to 
date) has been discussed far more in the secondary literature than it 
has been cited by other courts. In fact, despite the path breaking 
nature of Schmidt, it has been cited by only one other court,64 
although future Schmidt-like decisions may be in the metaphorical 
pipeline of pending litigation.65 
To appreciate the degree to which mandatory employment dis­
crimination coverage expands the concept of we and EL insur­
ance, one needs to recall the circumstance that bore the workers' 
compensation system. Prior to the advent of workers' compensa­
tion laws, workers worked, quite literally, at their own risk. An em­
ployee who was injured on the job had recourse in the courts, but 
could obtain compensation only if he or she successfully shouldered 
the burden of proving negligence by the employer. In addition to 
the practical logistical barriers established by the common law 
61. See Stempel, Unmet Expectations, supra note 6, at 265-72. 
62. 713 A.2d 1014 (N.J. 1998). 
63. See Sclafane, supra note 2, at 16; Hays, supra note 2, at 4. 
64. As of the date of publication of this Article, there. was only one case citing 
Schmidt v. Smith in the LEXIS-NEXIS "Mega" database, which includes all state and 
federal cases recorded by LEXIS: American Motorists Ins. Co. v. L-C-A Sales Co., 713 
A.2d 1007 (N.J. 1998). Although this would ordinarily not be unusual for such a recent 
case, it appears to me most significant because Schmidt was widely reported in the 
insurance trade press and even in the legal trade press. As noted above, supra note 3, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court is well-known and traditionally closely watched in mat­
ters of insurance law. In addition, most state workers' compensation laws have lan­
guage very similar to, if not identical with, the New Jersey language held by the Schmidt 
court to compel coverage. One would have expected at least the first salvo by claimants 
in other states seeking expanded coverage and compensation. 
65. See Sclafane, supra note 2, at 16 (noting that after Schmidt, "[I]nsurers are 
sifting through options for dealing with the ruling and some attorneys agree that old 
cases might be reopened. One carrier has already logged a jump in such claims"). Ac­
cording to sources at New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company, "125-150 discrim­
ination cases have already come in" since Schmidt, a number characterized as "a lot of 
activity" in that the insurer, which claims 20 percent of the New Jersey market, had not 
seen "any" such claims prior to Schmidt. See id. at 17. 
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method (e.g., was the injury severe enough to warrant a claim; did 
the worker even know a lawyer or how to find one; would a lawyer 
take the matter on contingency; if not, could the worker afford legal 
representation), employers could avail themselves to an array of 
common law defenses, such as the "fellow servant rule," which pro­
vided that the employer was not legally liable for worker injuries 
brought about by the negligence of co-workers. In its most extreme 
form, the fellow servant rule barred recovery where the employer 
was negligent but the co-worker was more negligent or exhibited 
negligence that was an intervening and superseding cause of the 
worker's injury. Assumption of risk also provided a powerful de­
fense to employers, as did contributory negligence. In short, rec­
ompense for an injured worker, like work itself, was no bed of roses 
for laborers during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
The advent of workers' compensation legislation changed 
much of the legal landscape in favor of the worker.66 Employers 
were made strictly liable for workplace injuries taking place in the 
ordinary course of employment, and the fellow servant defense was 
abolished.67 Defenses such as assumption of risk were also abol­
ished, although employers could still defeat claims if the injured 
worker engaged in "willful misconduct" or was outside the scope of 
employment at the time of injury.68 In return, employers did not 
face jury trials over the injuries and injured workers were compen­
sated according to a schedule of benefits.69 
While the average worker did not fare as well from the early 
20th century reforms as did railroad workers (who could sue under 
favorable circumstances provided under the Federal Employers Li­
ability Act ("FELA")),7° the conventional wisdom is that even with 
66. Regarding the pre-existing common law and the changes made by workers' 
compensation statutes, see LARSON & LARSON, supra note 5, §§ 1.02, 1.03, 2.01-.05, 
2.06-.08. New Jersey's statute, first enacted in part in 1911, is representative. See Na­
tional Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schneider, 392 A.2d 641, 642 (N.J. 1978). 
67. See LARSON & LARSON, supra note 5, §§ 1.01-.03, 2.03-.05. 
68. See id. §§ 30.01-38.06. The willful misconduct defense of the employer, 
although hardly toothless, is substantially less powerful than the common law doctrines 
such as contributory negligence and assumption of risk. For example, benign but fool­
ish horseplay does not bar recovery under the workers' compensation law, but would 
frequently be claim-barred negligence by the employee at common law. 
69. See id. §§ 2.07-.08. 
70. The Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.c. §§ 51-60 (1994), was enacted 
in 1908. It permits railroad workers to sue over work-related injuries in either state or 
federal court, but does not allow defendants to remove state court actions to federal 
court. See id. § 56. The worker plaintiff need only prove some negligence on the part 
of the railroad (not the preponderance normally required to prevail in tort litigation), 
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political compromise, workers' compensation reforms generally im­
proved the situations of employees. Today, there remains signifi­
cant debate about the efficacy of the workers' compensation 
system. Employers consistently complain about high benefit levels, 
high premiums, and significant fraud and abuse in the system. 
Workers, their attorneys, and labor advocates argue that the benefit 
schedules are too low, resulting in undercompensation for many 
InJunes. 
At the time of enactment of workers' compensation legislation 
during the early 20th century, there was, of course, no state or fed­
eral antidiscrimination law. At common law, employers were given 
an absolute right to discriminate against workers based on race, 
creed, color, ethnicity, or gender. Nothing short of physical vio­
lence against the worker was actionable, and even that appears to 
have been widely permitted as a practical matter under certain cir­
cumstances.71 Although the post-Civil War civil rights statutes had 
been enacted, the greatest potential aid to workers, 42 U.S.c. 
§ 1981, which provides a cause of action to one who is discriminated 
against in the making of a contract because of race, was not given 
full effect and enforcement until the Supreme Court decided Run­
yon v. McCrary.72 Furthermore, § 1981 is limited to cases of racial 
discrimination, and while it may also protect ethnic groups, it 
clearly does not outlaw gender discrimination. .. 
To perhaps belabor the obvious, the overarching theme of 
workers' compensatio~ law was not to attack invidious discrimina­
but any resulting award is reduced according to the plaintiff's percentage of negligence. 
See id. § 53. FELA plaintiffs are not subject to a schedule of benefits or any cap on 
awards and may recover counsel fees and punitive damages. Thus, although workers' 
compensation laws are generally regarded as a victory for the labor movement, they are 
hardly as pro-work~r as FELA. Ct. LARSON & LARSON, supra note 5, § 2.08, at 2-16 
(containing a more restrained characterization of the differences in the statutes and 
stating that FELA "is regarded by some segments of railway labor as preferable to 
workers' compensation acts" (footnote omitted». 
71. Regarding the history of employment discrimination law and the absence of 
significant prohibitions on job discrimination prior to the 1960's, see MICHAEL J. ZIM­
MER, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 3-32 (4th ed. 
1997). 
72. 427 U.S. 160, 172-74 (1976) (holding that plaintiffs alleging race discrimina­
tion in seeking to gain admission of child to private school stated a claim for race dis­
crimination under the statute). The force of Runyon v. McCrary was significantly 
curtailed in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164,171 (1989), which held that 
a bank teller harassed on the basis of her race did not state a claim under § 1981 since 
the harassment did not involve prohibition on contracting per se because of race. See 
also ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 69, at 95 (noting that the Patterson holding was legisla­
tively overruled by the Civil Rights Act of 1991). 
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tion in the workplace, but to give workers monetary relief for the 
sort of physical injury that occurred as an ordinary consequence of 
work, particularly physical labor. Workers' compensation law was 
originally intended to apply to flesh-and-blood workplace injury 
and was so structured.73 Over the years, interpretation of the stat­
ute has evolved and the concept of physical injury has expanded to 
encompass stress-related ulcers, carpal tunnel syndrome, job-in­
duced phobia, and the like.74 
Without a doubt, workers' compensation was not intended to 
be a job discrimination compensation system. Laws against dis­
crimination did not arrive until the 1964 Civil Rights Act.75 The 
New Jersey statute relied upon by the Schmidt court was enacted in 
1917. Although the 1964 Act prohibited gender discrimination,76 it 
was not widely construed to prohibit sexual harassment (as opposed 
to outright refusal to hire or promote women) until the Supreme 
Court's 1986 Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson 77 decision. For 
decades, workers' compensation legislation was referred to as 
workmen's compensation law-nomenclature that persists even to­
day among the less socially enlightened. Making workers' compen­
sation law into antidiscrimination law engrafts onto the statutory 
scheme a good deal more than was historically envisioned. 
Against this historical backdrop, it is more than fair to argue 
that the web of American antidiscrimination law is not part of the 
fabric of workers' compensation law, but is instead a separate sec­
tion of the law of civil liability. This is reflected not only by the 
presence of separate statutory schemes, case law, and doctrines 
governing both bodies of law, but in the organization of the legal 
profession as well. For example, the workers' compensation bar is 
distinct from the employment discrimination bar, with relatively lit­
tle overlap. Workers' compensation and job discrimination have 
73. See LARSON & LARSON, supra note 5, §§ 1.01-.04. 
74. See id. §§ 50.01-.07, 51.01-.05, 52.01-53.05, 56.01-.06. 
75. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-h (1994). 
76. See id. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Ironically, but fortunately, gender discrimination was 
added to the Act by its opponents, who were erroneously confident that a law barring 
gender discrimination would fail even if one outlawing race discrimination would not. 
But to the surprise of the smug sexists of Congress, other leaders and the public reacted 
positively to the addition of gender to the bill and sex discrimination remained prohib­
ited in the enacted final version of the law. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PInLIP P. 
FRICKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 15-16 (2d 
ed. 1995). See generally CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DE­
BATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1985). 
77. 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (construing sexual harassment to be a form of gender dis­
crimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act). 
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traditionally been two separate spheres of law and largely continue 
in that vein. 
Because workers' compensation legislation is broadly worded 
to apply to any "bodily injury," one can make a substantial case 
that workers' compensation and related legislation applies to bodily 
injury caused at the workplace, regardless of whether its source is 
discrimination or sexual harassment. Schmidt v. Smith78 presents a 
particularly compelling case for construing the law broadly. Lisa 
Schmidt was not merely upset over workplace sexism. She testified 
that she was physically assaulted by her boss on repeated occasions, 
and that as a result, she experienced anorexia, bulimia, and at­
tempted suicide on four occasions.79 Clearly, Lisa Schmidt's inju­
ries were bodily injuries for which the perpetrator and the employer 
should be held legally responsible. But this determination begs the 
question of whether the employer's WCIEL carrier should pick up 
the tab for this liability when the insurance policy contained an irre­
futably clear exclusion of such claims. 
Recall that WC insurance is marketed in tandem with EL in­
surance. As the Schmidt court itself observed, EL coverage is "tra­
ditionally written in conjunction with workers' compensation and is 
intended to serve as a 'gap-filler' providing protection to the em­
ployer in those situations where the employee has a right to bring a 
tort action despite provisions of the workers' compensation stat­
ute."80 The typical WC policy (and statute) exempts from coverage 
the employer's "serious and willful misconduct, the knowing em­
ployment of a worker in violation of the law ... and failure to com­
ply with health and safety laws."81 To fill the normal gaps existing 
between its WC coverage and its CGL coverage, the employer poli­
cyholder normally purchases EL coverage, which is "designed to 
protect the employer against liability from traditional physical in­
jury torts that may be brought by an employee."82 Thus, under 
New Jersey law, as elsewhere, an employer's WC policy does not 
cover the intentional torts committed by one co-worker against an- . 
other. However, such acts are ordinarily covered under EL poli­
78. 713 A.2d 1014 (N.J. 1998). 
79. See Schmidt v. Smith, 684 A.2d 66, 69 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996), affd, 
713 A.2d 1014 (N.J. 1998). 
80. Schmidt, 713 A.2d at 1017 (quoting Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry 
Ins. Co., 718 P.2d 920, 927 (Cal. 1986)). 
81. STEMPEL, supra note 38, § 21.01[a], at 21-6 to 21-7. 
82. Id. § 21.03, at 21-11. 
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cies, as long as the intentional injury was committed by the co­
worker, rather than the employer as an entity. 
Writing prior to the Schmidt v. Smith decision, this author ven­
tured that EL policies without language excluding coverage for em­
ployment claims could prove to be a crossroads of litigation over 
coverage: 
Notwithstanding that the drafters of the EL probably did not in­
tend to cover discharge and job discrimination claims (although 
they probably did not have a specific intent to exclude them 
either), the language of an EL may permit a policyholder to 
claim coverage that is denied in the CGL.83 
Policyholders without language in their EL policies that specifically 
addresses the issue of discrimination liability can make a good case 
for coverage, although case law is divided.84 However, "a welI­
drafted exclusion for employment-related harassment or discrimi­
nation claims should be enforceable ...."85 
In Schmidt, the USF&G EL policy at issue stated straightfor­
wardly that the EL insurance did not cover "[d]amages arising out 
of coercion . . . harassment . . . discrimination . . . any personnel 
practices, policies, acts or omissions."86 As the Schmidt court ob­
served, this exclusion is sufficiently understandable that a reason­
able policyholder would realize that discrimination and harassment 
claims are not covered; and clearly, the damages for which PAY 
(the employer) was liable in Schmidt were damages stemming from 
sexual harassment.87 
83. Id. 
84. See id. at 21-14. 
85. Id. (noting that recently issued EL policies "tend to include such exclusionary 
language"). 
86. Schmidt v. Smith, 713 A.2d 1014, 1017 (N.J. 1998). 
87. See id. at 1018. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the intermediate 
appellate court, which had engaged in considerable contortion to find that the insurer's 
harassment exclusion was ambiguous, in order to invoke the contra proferentem princi­
ple and construe the policy against the insurer and in favor of coverage. See Schmidt v. 
Smith, 684 A.2d 66, 73 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996), affd, 713 A.2d 1014 (N.J. 
1998). 
The New Jersey Supreme Court's rhetoric is perhaps a bit lukewarm in finding the 
harassment exclusion sufficiently clear to merit enforcement absent public policy con­
cerns. The court stated that "the phrasing of the exclusion is not 'so confusing that the 
average policyholder cannot make out the boundaries of coverage.'" Schmidt, 713 
A.2d at 1018 (quoting Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 405 A.2d 788 (N.J. 1979». But 
read fairly, the Schmidt exclusion is better than merely "non-confusing." It admits only 
one reasonable understanding: the EL policy in question and the issuing insurer did not 
contract to undertake coverage for sexual harassment or employment discrimination 
claims against PAY. 
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Under these circumstances it is clear that as a matter of con­
tract interpretation the insurer did not need to cover the Schmidt 
claim. Nearly every standard indicia of contract meaning points in 
this direction: clear text; seeming intent of the parties; the purpose 
of the WC/EL policies and the exclusion, which is particularly com­
pelling in light of the history of WC and EL coverage; as well as the 
reasonable expectations of the parties. The insurer clearly did not 
intend to provide such coverage. The average policyholder reading 
this exclusion could not form a reasonable belief that it had cover­
age, since both the language of the policy and the traditional func­
tion of EL policies does not provide such coverage. 
Arrayed against this veritable deck of interpretative factors 
favoring the insurer, the Schmidt court invoked essentially one 
trump card: New Jersey law requires employers to obtain insurance 
coverage for all work-related bodily injuries suffered by workers.88 
According to the court: 
In order to assure that this statutory remedy given in lieu of a 
common law remedy is not illusory, the Legislature has required 
that every employer carry Workers' Compensation insurance. 
Those policies must cover not only claims for compensation pros­
ecuted in the Workers' Compensation court, but also claims for 
work-related injuries asserted in a common law court. . . . In 
short, the terms of a policy cannot conflict with the statutory 
mandate that there be coverage provided for all occupational 
injuries.89 
Although this is an important statutory mandate required of em­
ployers, it hardly follows that insurers violate the law by selling em­
ployers an insurance product subsequently found by a court to be 
insufficiently comprehensive in its bodily injury coverage. Despite 
the "semi-public" nature of WCIEL insurance,9o the court effected 
an expansion of the insurance status quo not envisioned (much less 
commanded) by the legislature when it held not only that the in­
surer and employer are subject to the statutory mandate, but that 
remedy for failing to provide this coverage is court-mandated 
coverage. 
The language in Schmidt quoted above is grounded in prece­
dent which holds that insurance sold to fulfill an employer's WC 
and EL insurance needs must be as broad as the statutory mandate 
88. See Schmidt, 713 A.2d at 1018. 
89. Id. at 1016-17. 
90. See LARSON & LARSON, supra note 5, § 92. 
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imposed on employers. But this approach may impose unnecessary 
burdens on WCIEL insurers in relation to other commercial actors 
such as the employers themselves. Even if under New Jersey law an 
employer's mandate must be the insurer's mandate, it remains un­
clear as to whether harassment and discrimination fall within that 
mandate, in view of the distinctions between discrimination claims 
and traditional workers' compensation claims. Unfortunately, the 
Schmidt court did not linger over these questions; instead, it leapt 
to a broad, compulsive reading of the statute in order to override a 
clear contract exclusion. 
As noted above, insurance sold to employers to fulfill their 
workers' compensation obligations is more public than the average 
insurer-policyholder contract. In defense of the Schmidt court, it 
can be said that the leading treatise on workers' compensation, as a 
matter of black letter law, emphasizes the requirements imposed on 
WCIEL insurers by courts pursuant to the statutes: 
Since compensation insurance is for the benefit of the em­
ployee as well as of the employer, some of the usual incidents of 
insurance are modified for the employee's protection. Defenses, 
such as nonpayment of premiums or breach of policy conditions, 
which the insurer might have against the employer, are not avail­
able against the employee. Moreover, under many statutes, a 
policy cannot be canceled merely by action of the insurer, the 
employer or both; notice to the compensation commission is or­
dinarily required, followed by an interval in which replacement 
of the insurance can be effected. The compensation commission 
has jurisdiction to pass upon questions of compensation insur­
ance when they affect the rights of the employee, while questions 
purely between the insurer and insured may remain within the 
jurisdiction of the courtS.91 
The distinctive feature of compensation insurance is that, 
although it arises from a contract between the employer and the 
carrier, it creates a sort of insured status in the employee that 
comes to have virtually an independent existence. The insurance 
carrier therefore stands in two relations: to the employer, to pro­
tect it from the burden of its compensation liability, and to the 
employee, to ensure that he or she gets the benefits called for by 
the statute. The former relation is governed largely by the insur­
ance contract; the latter is ~overned by the statute.92 
Thus, a significant number of insurer defenses that are other­
91. Id. § 92, at 17-1 (emphasis removed). 
92. Id. § 92.21, at 17-14 to 17-16. 
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wise available against the employer are not permitted to defeat an 
employee's claim for coverage under the policy. These include mis­
representation, concealment, failure to report compensation, failure 
to give proper notice, unauthorized assignment, and other arguable 
breaches of a policyholder's duty of cooperation and good faith.93 
Furthermore, "[T]he law has undertaken to compel a certain mini­
mum coverage in insurance contracts, regardless of any narrower 
agreement between insurer and employer."94 
Accordingly, there is conventional wisdom that may be cited 
for support by the Schmidt court: "[I]f a compensation policy is 
written at all, the insurer will frequently find that the scope of its 
liability to employees is taken completely out of the hands of the 
parties to the insurance contract and dictated by the law of the 
state."95 However, the treatise writers making this statement say 
mandated insurance under the statute is designed mainly to prevent 
insurers from "cherry picking" the best risks while refusing others. 
Their overall discussion of required coverage focuses on the pre­
sumed legislative intent of having WCIEL insurance cover all as­
pects of the employer's operations.96 However, there appears to be 
no clear mandate to require particular forms of coverage outside of 
the traditional core of coverage provided for typical workplace 
physical injury. 
Therefore, despite the differences between WCIEL insurance 
and CGL insurance, the Schmidt court clearly could have been 
more flexible and fair with the insurer regarding the case remedy. 
Notwithstanding previous cases construing employer mandates to 
be insurer mandates, the court could have also recognized that in 
this case inadequate insurance was the employer's problem and not 
the insurer's problem. For example, the court could have made its 
decision prospective only. Prior to Schmidt, most casual observers 
would have reasonably expected that clear exclusionary language in 
an insurance policy would have been enforced when the nature of 
the exclusion was consistent with the general grant of coverage. 
In addition, the court could easily have held the employer re­
93. Seeid. at 17-17. 
94. Id. § 93.10, at 17-99. 
95. Id. 
96. See id. §§ 93.10, 93.20-.30, at 17-99, 17-106, 17-108. Consequently, when it is 
said that New Jersey has "one of the stiffest types" of "full-coverage" workers' compen­
sation statutes, it must be emphasized that the treatise authors refer to a requirement 
that there be coverage of the full range of the employer's operations, not that there 
must be coverage (even if clearly excluded) for all manner of the employer's liability­
creating activities and consequences. See id. § 93.20, at 17-104. 
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sponsible for deficiencies in such newly minted mandatory cover­
age. It is the employer to whom the statutory mandate is directed. 
Even if the insurer was contributing to the delinquency of the em­
ployer by issuing an EL policy that did not include full coverage for 
all manner of work-related bodily injuries, it is by no means clear 
that the appropriate remedy is to force the insurer into providing 
the coverage it thought it had excluded and which the court con­
cluded was excluded by the clear language of the insurance policy 
at issue. Furthermore, it does not appear that state regulators in 
any way disapproved of the exclusion for discrimination or harass­
ment found in the policy at issue in Schmidt. Although the more 
express exclusion at issue in the case is relatively new, it was hardly 
secret and may even be commonplace in most WClEL policies.97 
Statutory mandates of employer financial responsibility are im­
portant in the law. So, too, is judicial enforcement of contracts. If 
the court was determined to give its decision retroactive effect, a 
better means of mediating any tension between these two legal val­
ues (if the insurer is to be blamed at all) would have been to levy an 
appropriate administrative fine upon the insurer for writing non­
conforming coverage (albeit unintentionally in view of the path­
breaking nature of the Schmidt decision). It is unlikely that even a 
serious fine would have equaled the more than $181,000 for which 
the insurer was held liable by the court (for insurance coverage that 
the court found was expressly disclaimed).98 
Beyond this seemingly excessive punishment, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court's primary error remains its unduly broad reading of 
the employer mandates of the statute. As noted above, WCIEL 
coverage historically and functionally has been applied to physical 
injuries that come from working under normal conditions gone 
awry (e.g., a crushed finger in a punch press), even where the cover­
age is under the EL policy for an intentional tort (e.g., a brawl be­
tween co-workers arguing over respective responsibilities for curing 
a defect in construction) rather than the WC policy for accidental 
injuries. Traditionally, the expected scope of EL coverage has not 
97. The initial policy issued to PAY excluded coverage for "[d]amages arising out 
of the discharge of, coercion of, or discrimination against any employee in violation of 
the law," language that when properly read would exclude the claim in Schmidt. Prior 
to the Schmidt incidents, the exclusion was amended to its more exclusionary form. 
The new exclusion barred coverage not only for discrimination, but also for "harass· 
ment," "humiliation," as well as for "any personnel practices, policies, acts or omis­
sions." See Schmidt, 713 A.2d at 1017. 
98. See id. at 1016 (noting the total award of $181,730.36 to plaintiff Schmidt 
against PAY and Smith). 
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included discrimination and harassment claims, at least not with 
sufficient force to create an expectation that would override clear 
exclusionary language. This is the case notwithstanding that the ba­
sic state statute requires that the employer, not the insurer, have 
sufficient means to satisfy bodily injury claims by workers. 
To justify its abrupt and counterintuitive break in the law, the 
Schmidt court did invoke precedent to buttress its view that insur­
ers are equally bound by the statute that commands that employers 
be capable of satisfying work-related claims by employees. Accord­
ing to the Schmidt court, "USF&G must indemnify PAV, however, 
for the same reason that New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance 
Company had to indemnity Variety Farms for its obligations to the 
underage employee injured in that case. "99 Although citing the 
1980 Variety Farms decision assists the Schmidt court's campaign to 
suggest it is not engaging in the manufacture of new forms of man­
dated EL coverage, Variety Farms is a relatively weak reed on 
which to hang the substantial obligations imposed on EL carriers 
under Schmidt. 
In Variety Farms, Inc. v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance 
Co. ,100 the employer hired a 15-year-old worker, underage by state 
law, who was seriously injured at work. The youth worker sued for 
workers' compensation benefits but the EL carrier refused, citing 
an exclusion from coverage where the claim involved "any em­
ployee employed in violation of hiw with the knowledge or acquies­
cence of the insured or any executive officer thereof."101 The 
Variety Farms court found the exclusion unenforceable because the 
EL policy had implicitly been issued to the employer to comply 
with the statutory workers' compensation and employer liability 
coverage mandate. The court reasoned that the statutory goal of 
adequate coverage for workers would be unreasonably defeated if 
the insurer was permitted to enforce the exclusion.102 
Unlike Schmidt, however, the Variety Farms court grounded its 
decision in the historical context of the movement toward workers' 
compensation legislation and the traditional function of we and 
EL insurance,103 invoking. precedent from National Grange Mutual 
99. Id. at 1018 (citing Variety Farms, Inc. v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 410 A.2d 
696 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980». 
100. 410 A.2d 696 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980). 
101. Id. at 698. 
102. See id. at 699-700. 
103. See id. at 700. 
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Insurance Co. v. Schneider.104 Quoting National Grange, the Vari­
ety Farms court focused on the core function of the workers' com­
pensation system. 
[T]he minor's suit ... [must be] fitted consciously and appropri­
ately into a complex and balanced system of compe'nsation for 
work injuries . 
. . . The statutes we deal with were necessary legislative reac­
tions to 19th Century industrial excesses. The reformers who cre­
ated workmen's compensation and factory law remedies. for 
injured workers and industrially abused minors simply. would not 
purposely deprive an illegally employed 13-year-old, who claims 
injury by the negligence of his employer, insurance protection 
granted routinely to almost everyone else. !Os 
Both courts in Variety Farms and National Grange based their 
decisions mandating coverage on the original intent of the legisla­
ture enacting the workers' compensation system .. Both decisions 
also relied on the historical context of the statute and the nature of 
the instant claims, tragic but all-too-common physical injuries to un­
derage employees operating dangerous machinery at work as part 
of their ordinary workplace duties. In short, both decisions viewed 
the coverage at issue as reasonably expected by the .participants in 
the workers' compensation system, including the we and EL insur­
ers, in light of the totality of the circumstances. 
By contrast, Schmidt v. Smith 106 involved a type of claim far 
removed from the original legislation and customary employer-in­
surer expectations. Without in any way diminishing the seriousness 
and wrongfulness of sexual harassment, it is clear that coverage for 
sexual harassment and job discrimination is not wbat legislators, 
employers, or insurers had in mind prior to the modern era of em­
ployment litigation. In New Jersey, the statutory provision read so 
broadly by the Schmidt court predates the sexual harassment cause 
of action by more than 60 years.107 
Where the EL policy is silent on the topic, it is still appropriate 
104. 392 A.2d 641 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978). In National Grange, a 13­
year-old meat market employee lost his right arm in a meat grinder accident. When the 
youth sought benefits the insurer rejected coverage, citing the policy's illegal employ­
ment exclusion. Both the National Grange and Variety Farms courts rejected this de­
fense. See id. at 644. 
105. Variety Farms, 410 A.2d at 701 (quoting National Grange, 392 A.2d at 644). 
106. 713 A.2d 1014 (N.J. 1998). 
107. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (stating that 
"Title VII affords employees the right to work in an environment free from discrimina­
tory intimidation, ridicule and insult"). 
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to find coverage for job discrimination and sexual harassment and 
to reject insurer arguments that the harassment was not an "acci­
dent," that emotional trauma suffered by the victim was not suffi­
cient "bodily injury," or that certain relief for the victim does not 
qualify as "damages."108 But where the insurer in most certain 
terms excludes coverage for harassment, discrimination, and coer­
cion on the face of an EL policy issued to a commercial policy­
holder, any statutory or public policy case for coverage seems to 
lack the force required to overcome such a clear exclusion. 
Put another way, child labor and workers left incapacitated by 
machines have long been part-and-parcel to the system of workers' 
compensation and employer liability. Coverage for such claims is 
justified even when policy language is substantially to the contrary. 
Discrimination and harassment should not, in view of their relative 
recency and disturbance of prior expectations, similarly override 
contrary language in the policy. 
Schmidt thus represents an exercise in judicial activism and 
court-created insurance coverage that is not justified in view of the 
circumstances of the claim, the language and purpose of the policy 
at issue, the historical context and expectations of the parties, and 
the availability of more apt remedies and means of fostering greater 
EL coverage in the future. Despite its sympathetic factual situa­
tion, Schmidt exceeds the bounds of legitimate judicial law-making 
and contract reformation. 
IV. CONTINUING TENSION ON THE EMPLOYMENT CLAIMS 





Beyond the suspect methodology of Schmidt, however, there 
remains the harder question: even if Schmidt is bad law, is it good 
policy? After decades of being the dirty little secret of the Ameri­
can workplace, employee injuries for discrimination and harass­
ment have finally received the serious attention they deserve. Title 
VII is less than 35 years old, but has had, and continues to have, a 
profound impact in the workplace. The sexual harassment compo­
nent of Title VII protection accorded workers is barely a decade old 
and has, during the 1990's alone, become a wellspring of litigation 
and a source of employer concern and action. In 1998, the United 
States Supreme Court decided four sexual harassment cases,109 sub­
108. See generally STEMPEL, supra note 38, § 21.03. 
109. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998) (holding the 
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stantially clarifying the law in this area; an indication not only of the 
growing importance of gender discrimination law, but also its rela­
tive youth. 
Without a doubt, the impact of discrimination law during the 
final third of the 20th century has been enormous. While many em­
ployers and social critics decry the trend,llo this author would like 
to disassociate himself from the seeming backlash against discrimi­
nation law. While surely there are weak and frivolous claims, the 
"boom" in employment discrimination claims has, for the most 
part, occurred because many employers or their agents have ille­
gally engaged in discrimination and harassment grounded in gen­
der, race, age, or ethnicity. Such conduct is illegal and its victims 
deserve legal recompense. Its perpetrators should be held responsi­
ble and in appropriate circumstances punished through exemplary 
damages (or even incarceration for extreme cases such as assault, 
battery, or rape). 
Although critics may treat job discrimination, particularly sex­
ual harassment claims, as the product of excessive political correct­
ness or a new puritanism, this emerging area of litigation really 
represents the first stages of a statutory movement toward social 
equality. Protracted litigation, expense, and the occasional bogus 
claim by the malcontent worker are simply the prices that must be 
paid to apply this body of law, such that laudable social goals un­
derlying the law are effected. Weak or frivolous contract claims are 
brought with significant frequency, often by well-heeled litigants 
who engage in costly wars of attrition. Yet no one suggests that the 
legal system's establishment of enforceable contract rights was a 
mistake that needs undoing. Rather, our legal system returns to the 
ongoing task of separating the bona fide claims from those that 
should not impose liability. Workers should have legal protection 
against race and gender discrimination just as contracting parties 
defendant vicariously liable for sexual harassment by lifeguard supervisors in absence 
of effective city procedure permitting victims to report grievances); Burlington Indus., 
Inc. v. Elierth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998) (finding that Title VII permits sexual harassment 
claim even where plaintiff's refusal to submit to sexual advances did not result in dis­
charge or lost promotion opportunities); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. 
Ct. 1989 (1998) (finding school district not liable under Title IX where student plaintiff 
failed to report teacher's misconduct to responsible school officials); Oncale v. Sun­
downer Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998) (holding that Title VII applies to 
same-gender sexual harassment). 
110. See, e.g., WALTER B. OLSEN, THE EXCUSE FACTORY (1998) (criticizing the 
creation of antidiscrimination rights, including protection accorded to workers under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title VII, and the ADEA, for fostering an atmos­
phere of employee opportunism and workplace inefficiency). 
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should have recourse to courts when contracts are breached, as in­
vestors should continue to enjoy protection under the securities 
laws, as victims of negligent injury should have the protection of 
tort law, and so on. 
But, to say that Title VII and similar statutes are wise and de­
serve continued enforcement obviously does not answer the ques­
tion of who should pick up the tab for defense, settlement, and 
judgments occasioned by such claims. One school of insurance and 
public policy thought argues that discrimination and harassment 
claims should not be insurable at all because much of the conduct at 
issue borders on the volitional. While one can certainly make a 
case for requiring employers to internalize all costs of such claims, it 
is an unconvincing case for several reasons. 
• First, despite the "intentional act" sounding nomenclature 	 of 
terms like "race discrimination" and "sexual harassment," a large 
amount of alleged workplace employment discrimination appears 
to be the result of unconscious prejudices (e.g., attitudes about 
whether women can understand machines or should be on the 
road 300 days a year, or whether a 60-year-old account represen­
tative still has the same zeal for his job), rather than an overt 
dislike of women, racial minorities, or older workers.111 
Although some oppose recovery in such situations, they are 
wrong. Discrimination, even if subconscious, nonetheless vio­
lates the law and injures the affected worker. Relief should be 
available, provided that the worker plaintiff can satisfy the 
pragmatically tougher burden of proving that the adverse em­
ployment decision really was the product of discrimination rather 
than serendipity or a merits-based decision with which the plain­
tiff merely disagrees. 
• Second, even if the actor inflicting discriminatory 	treatment or 
harassment is acting with hateful racism or sexism, this hardly 
means that all defendants in the ensuing lawsuit are guilty of the 
same malice. The corporate employer defendant, which is often 
the deep pocket that will actually pay the resulting judgment or 
111. See STEMPEL, supra note 38, § 21.04 (discussing varieties of intentional and 
inadvertent discrimination and implications for insurance coverage); Ann C. McGinley, 
The Emerging Cronyism Defense and Affirmative Action: A Critical Perspective on the 
Distinction Between Colorblind and Race·Conscious Decision Making Under Title VII, 
39 ARIz. L. REv. 1003 (1997) (identifying unconscious discrimination against women 
and minorities due to cronyism, social networks, unconscious stereotypes, and other 
attitudes that fall short of conscious intent to discriminate against particular workers). 
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settlement, frequently is not acting with malicious intent at all. 
The employer's liability-creating "sin" may simply be that it 
failed to establish a system for monitoring discrimination by indi­
vidual employees, was unable to recognize discrimination in its 
midst, or was unable to act forcefully enough to curb the individ­
ual perpetrator and assist the victim. Such failures of recognition 
or nerve, as the case may be, should not be condoned by the law, 
but neither should they make this very real risk of doing business 
uninsurable. 
• Third, litigation claims may result in "false positives": incorrect 
factfinder assessments that impose liability even when the de­
fendant did not, in fact, discriminate, but simply treated the em­
ployee badly or was a less sympathetic litigant than the 
employee. Although these false positives do not occur with the 
frequency suggested by some critics of employment discrimina­
tion litigation (who, to paraphrase Will Rogers, never met a de­
fendant they did not like), erroneous liability determinations in 
discrimination claims do occur. Similarly, factfinders at times im­
pose liability for breach of contract or fraud when the defendant 
was merely a hard bargainer, or where a tort defendant manufac­
tured a product that was safe if properly used, but the jury fails to 
appreciate the plaintiff's misuse of the product. No one seriously 
suggests that insurance should be unavailable for tort claims 
(although the market may be difficult at times for such claims) or 
that contract rights are a bad thing, even though they can lead to 
controversial decisions like Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc. ,112 which 
imposed multibillion dollar liability on a company for what many 
regarded as permissible business behavior (attempting to beat a 
competitor by acquiring another company). 
• Fourth, 	even if claims are properly characterized as marginal, 
they can be costly for defendants. Even marginal claims have 
some settlement value, particularly if the claimant has advan­
tages of forum selection or natural sympathy from factfinders. 
Even where the defendant adopts a "millions for defense but not 
one cent for tribute" philosophy, the cost of defending such vir­
tue may be high. Successful litigation is not cheap. It requires 
legal counsel and related expenses irrespective of the merits of 
the claim. While the frivolous claim may ordinarily be more eas­
112. 481 U.S. 1,9 (1987) (reversing the federal court's attempt to enjoin enforce­
ment of a multibillion dollar state court judgment and describing the facts of the state 
court litigation). 
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ily defeated without trial than the marginal claim, neither can be 
eliminated for free. Certainly, strong but unsuccessful claims are 
expensive to defeat, even though a judgment is never obtained 
against the policyholder. To an extent, defendants lose even 
when they win.113 
For all of these reasons, commercial actors should be able to obtain 
insurance coverage for job discrimination claims. But, reaching this 
conclusion still begs the question of how this risk should be man­
aged and what insurance products should be deployed in the 
operation. 
To a large extent, the market has answered this question. Pri­
vate insurers, left to their own devices, have established insurance 
products dealing with employment-related claims. The primary ve­
hicle, of course, is the WC policy in tandem with the EL policy. 
These policies provide coverage for employee claims under state 
workers' compensation law. This combined product addresses what 
has been, and continues to be, the major source of workplace 
claims: physical injury on the job that takes place in essentially the 
ordinary course of business because of the nature of the work. 
The EL policy supplements the WC policy by providing cover­
age for similarly long-recognized physical injuries, resulting from 
essentially inherent workplace hazards. As discussed above, the EL 
policy was designed as a supplement to the WC policy ~nd was 
probably never intended to apply to race and gender discrimination 
claims. 
The CGL and other liability policies are designed to cover 
traditional risks of claims by third parties over the types of incidents 
that normally occasion third-party lawsuits. Such claims include 
conventional torts committed by workers or agents, claims arising 
out of defective products, or business competition, including com­
mercial disparagement and defamation claims. 
When third-party liability claims are new or out-of-the-ordi­
nary, insurers often resist these claims as outside the scope of in­
113. Before anyone reaches for a handkerchief on behalf of litigation defendants, 
I should add that the same holds true for plaintiffs. They may obtain a judgment, but 
nonetheless have a net loss, because they were required to expend funds on counsel 
fees and related expenses due to a defendant's tort, breach of contract, or statutory 
violation. Sometimes the defendant seeks bankruptcy protection and the judgment 
debt is discharged for pennies on the dollar. In addition, commercial litigants have the 
advantage, in most cases, of deducting disputing costs from their income tax as a cost of 
doing business. Individual litigants, like employees claiming job discrimination, ordina­
rily have no such government subsidy for their claims. 
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tended coverage, notwithstanding the literal breadth of language in 
the liability policy. Take, for example, the emerging field of pollu­
tion coverage. Insurers sought not to provide coverage for pollu­
tion claims unless the pollution at issue was abrupt, since the policy 
required that the discharge be "sudden and accidental," notwith­
standing that most dictionaries list the first meaning of "sudden" as 
"unexpected."1l4 In a related part of the pollution coverage saga, 
insurers also resisted coverage of pollution-related claims under the 
Personal Injury ("PI") section of the CGL, which provided cover­
age (without a pollution exclusion) for a claim of "wrongful entry" 
by the policyholder. Policyholders have argued (and have even had 
some success in litigation) that seepage of toxic waste onto adjoin­
ing property is a "wrongful entry" within the meaning of the 
CGL.IIS 
Although a thorough discussion of these coverage disputes lies 
well beyond the scope of this Article, this author merely observes 
that insurers resisting coverage in these cases argued against textual 
literalism and in favor of policy construction that accords with the 
purpose of the policies. Consider the stronger of the two previous 
examples. The "wrongful entry" aspect of the PI coverage of the 
CGL was aimed at conventional claims of trespass, and not at mod­
ern pollution claims arising well after the policies were contem­
plated and authored. Ordinarily, insurers should prevail in such 
litigation even though the literal language of the CGL favors policy­
holders on this point (a pollutant that seeps into the groundwater 
does, after all, "enter" property and cause damage).1l6 
Like pollution, employment discrimination claims are matters 
for which traditional liability insurers seek to avoid coverage. Some 
of this resistance may simply be fear of the new and unfamiliar. 
More of it is fear of the actuarially new and difficult to calculate. 
CGL insurers have long used language seeking to bar workplace­
related claims. With the onset of discrimination claims, these insur­
ers have steadily sought to strengthen this ·exclusionary language 
and avoid covering employment discrimination claims altogether. 
114. See STEMPEL, supra note 38, § 14.11[b] (discussing the history, evolution, 
and current status of coverage litigation over the Qualifi~d Pollution Exclusion). 
115. See id. § 14.05[b] (discussing the history, evolution, and current status of liti­
gation seeking coverage for pollution claims under the Personal Injury part of the 
CGL). 
116. See id. (discussing how wrongful entry and trespass coverage provided under 
Personal Injury provisions of the CGL was designed to cover traditional entry and tres­
pass clainls, such as controversies between landlords and tenants, or property disputes 
among neighbors, rather than pollution claims). 
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Instead of having discrimination and harassment claims cov­
ered under the CGL, the insurance industry's own conduct has sug­
gested that insurers do not want such claims subject to the CGL, 
but rather, that discrimination risks are better underwritten, priced, 
and administered through an Employment Practices Liability 
("EPL") policy. EPL policies differ from CGL and other liability 
policies in a number of ways.u7 The EPL policy is offered only in 
the claims-made form. It is relatively expensive in relation to the 
coverage limits provided. It contains a substantial deductible or 
self-insured retention ("SIR"). The policies typically have an ag­
gregate limit as well as a per claim limit, and may also have "burn­
ing limits" where the costs of defending claims reduces the policy 
limits available for paying claims. Most importantly, EPL insurance 
is underwritten as a separate, specified risk. The insurer that offers 
EPL coverage investigates the employer applicant with a particular 
eye to the business in question, the workforce, and likely sources of 
claims, including discrimination, sexual harassment, and similar 
risks that have historically not been part of the underwriting investi­
gation process for WC, EL, or CGL policies.118 
In short, insurers either want to avoid discrimination and har­
assment coverage altogether, via exclusions, or to monitor and con­
trol it very tightly through writing only the specified risk EPL policy 
for such coverage, so that they can better monitor loss experience 
and adjust their risk with some alacrity. This is the behavior of an 
insurance industry still getting its feet wet in EPL as an aspect of 
liability insurance. There are signs that the EPL segment of the 
insurance market is also showing the normal signs of development 
within the industry. For example, during the past few years EPL 
limits have gone up significantly while premium costs have gone 
down substantially. One is reminded of calculators and personal 
computers, where the cost of calculation or computation decreased 
dramatically as the industry's learning curve brought greater manu­
facturing efficiency. 
117. See id. § 21.03 (describing EPL policy and its traits); see also ANDREW 
KAPLAN ET AL., THE EPL BOOK: A PRAcrICAL GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT PRAcrICES 
LIABILITY AND INSURANCE 110-96 (1997) (describing policy structure, defense and set­
tlement provisions, exclusions, definitions, conditions, and operation of EPL policy). 
118. Although the EPL policy is generally viewed as a more prudent means of 
accepting the risk of discrimination litigation coverage, it remains a relatively new prod­
uct in a new area for insurers. See Jennifer L. Cox & Bernard E. Jacques, Risks of 
EPLI Coverage Prove Difficult to Assess: Employment Practices Liability Insurance 
Presents Risk Factors Not Found in Other Policy Forms, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 21, 1998, at 
B14. 
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Without being excessively sanguine about the mythical, all­
knowing, all-responsive powers of the market (even the father of 
market theory, Adam Smith, was not so rabid a cheedeader),119 
one can see the insurance industry responding to employment dis­
crimination claims as a type of business liability that insurers are 
willing to insure-but only under certain conditions. Most impor­
tantly, insurers appear unwilling to insure discrimination claims as 
part of the package of traditional liability coverage for worker 
claims (under WC or EL coverage) or typical third party claims (in­
sured under the CGL). 
Rather, the insurance industry has attempted to treat discrimi­
nation claims like pollution claims (including government-ordered 
pollution cleanup).12o Insurers also want these claims out of the 
traditional bundle of liability coverage. Some insurers are willing to 
write this coverage (there is a growing market of Environmental 
Impairment ("EI") insurance just as there is a growing market of 
EPL insurance) but only as a separate product, more carefully tai­
lored to the risk and more closely monitored and controlled by the 
insurer than is possible when the coverage is offered as part of an 
omnibus package of more traditional coverage with which the in­
dustry has more longstanding experience. 
Although one should not worship markets too credulously,121 
neither should one ignore them. Where a commercial market has 
spoken, one should ordinarily start with the proposition that this 
says something worth absorbing. One may, upon further analysis, 
conclude that the market has erred because of historical, social, 
political, or other factors, thus prompting one to favor government 
119. See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF 
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Knopf ed. 1991) (1776) (identifying market operation and 
generally praising its effects, but admitting the need for certain external government or 
social controls to permit markets to work well). 
120. See STEMPEL, supra note 38, § 14.12 (describing a split in the courts regard­
ing coverage under older CGL language and the insurance industry's move to a more 
strongly worded exclusion barring coverage for government-mandated cleanup of pol­
luted property). 
121. As Anthony Kronman has observed: 

You want to know what a really free market looks like? Go to Moscow. That's 

a really free market. Market without law, without courts, where market grows 

from the barrel of a gun. And why shouldn't it? In a perfectly free market, 

when you begin to introduce the elements that distinguish our market from 

Moscow's, what you see growing is the realm of law. 

Anthony T. Kronman, Legal Professionalism, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 
1999) (arguing that to work well, markets require at least a critical minimum of regula­
tion so that contracts are enforced and other rights protected to encourage investment 
and growth). 
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intervention. At least at the outset, regulators (executive, legisla­
tive, administrative, and judicial) should tread lightly before man­
dating or barring conduct by actors in the private market. Unless 
the market conduct in question implicates serious public health 
risks or similar matters of urgency, caution is advisable before man­
dating coverage. 
Therein lies the core of my concern with the Schmidt v. 
Smith 122 decision. As noted above, this author finds Schmidt troub­
ling because of its overly broad approach to statutory construction 
(even the construction of a remedial statute) and its willingness to 
read a word with literal dictionary breadth and relatively little re­
gard for the historical context and purpose of the statute. Literal­
ism and extreme formalism are similarly troubling when applied to 
the reading of insurance policies or other contracts. Many courts, 
however, embrace such literalism and strict application of a seem­
ingly "clear" facial meaning of contract or statutory text. Both 
sides of this hermeneutic debate would find common ground in 
holding that judicial overriding of contract language, on the basis of 
a general statutory framework or over arching notions of public pol­
icy, should take place only when necessary to override contract 
meaning in the service of compelling or mandated socio-Iegal goals. 
One searches in vain for that justification in Schmidt. The 
court simply decided that because the workers' compensation stat­
utes of New Jersey require employers to be responsible for bodily 
injury claims by workers, any insurance purchased by an employer 
must necessarily provide coverage for bodily injury stemming from 
sexual harassment claims. Although it is good for claimants if de­
fendants have insurance to pay claims, it is not socially required, 
except in select circumstances. Auto insurance is the best example 
outside workers' compensation insurance, but most states require 
only minimal financial responsibility for those driving automobiles. 
Furthermore, the impetus behind these "financial responsibility 
laws" is that many drivers do not possess sufficient personal assets 
to be financially responsible absent insurance. In order to promote 
compensation for traffic accident victims, society mandates insur­
ance for drivers, and the case law has tended to prevent such cover­
age from being defeated by insurer defenses.123 
122. 713 A.2d 1014 (N.J. 1998). 
123. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 134 S.E.2d 654, 660 (N.C. 
1964) (holding that under state mandated auto insurance, it makes no difference 
whether the policyholder's acts were wilful, wanton, reckless,or negligent). 
1999] PUBLIC POLICY IN EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES LIABILITY 317 

For employer policyholders, the social reasons for mandating 
coverage of discrimination claims are not as compelling.124 Most 
employers, even the corner grocer and newsstands, have some as­
sets from which an employee's discrimination or harassment claim 
may be paid. Thus, the legislature's desire for adequate financial 
responsibility of employers for the victims of discrimination will or­
dinarily be satisfied without rewriting the insurance policy 
purchased by the employer, which did not provide for coverage of 
discrimination claims beyond the traditional core of workers' com­
pensation and employers' liability claims. 
The historical background. here is important. Traditionally, 
WC and EL insurance coverage packages offered to the employer 
did not envision providing protection for discrimination claims, and 
in its modern form, contains clear and broad language designed to 
eliminate coverage for such claims. Furthermore, according to 
American Motorists Insurance Co. v. L-C-A Sales Co. ,125 decided 
the same day, by the same New Jersey Supreme Court that issued 
the Schmidt ruling, this language clearly and successfully excludes 
such coverage. For the CGL insurer (in L-C-A), the exclusion is 
enforced, but for the EL insurer in Schmidt, the same clear lan­
guage was judicially nullified. Does the "semi-public" nature of 
WC and EL insurance really justify such disparate treatment of 
contracts? 
All of this seeming judicial error is committed in the name of 
enhancing coverage, although the case for the judicial mandate is 
suspect. As noted above, the commercial actors likely to be dis­
crimination defendants do have their own resources that are avail­
able to satisfy such claims. Furthermore, these same commercial 
actors purchased EL insurance that contained clear language ex­
cluding coverage for claims such as those brought by Lisa Schmidt. 
Where is the jurisprudential wisdom in providing such defendants 
124. Even if it were as compelling as the auto insurance statutes' intent of foster­
ing compensation for accident victims, this still would not support a wildly broad read­
ing of the statute. As one court observed, 
The entire [uninsured motorist] act is remedial in nature and is entitled to a 
liberal construction to effectuate the purpose thereof. But ... it should not by 
judicial interpretation be extended beyond the plain intent of the statute .... 
Insurers may limit their liability and impose whatever conditions they please 
upon their obligations, provided such conditions are not in contravention of 
some statutory inhibition or public policy. 
Marchant v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 316 S.E.2d 707, 708-09 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984) (cita­
tions omitted). 
125. 713 A.2d 1007 (N.J. 1998). 
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with coverage which they implicitly declined and for which they 
never paid the requisite premium? Furthermore, despite the rather 
new and relatively thin market for EPL coverage, it appears that 
the insurance industry does provide coverage for defendants, such 
as Dennis Smith and PAV, should they not wish to risk their per­
sonal assets in the event of a discrimination claim. 
Although broad-based insurance coverage is, in theory, a won­
derful thing, whether it should be required is normally regarded as 
a question for the legislature. Although Schmidt arguably is pre­
mised on the notion that the New Jersey legislature has already 
made this determination, this author suspects that this comes as 
quite a revelation for the legislators who originally authored New 
Jersey Statute section 34:15-72 some 50 years before Title VII was 
enacted, and some 70 years before the Meritor Savings Bank, FSB 
v. Vinson 126 decision declared that sexual harassment was actiona­
ble under Title VII.127 
At the risk of sounding like the quintessential jurisprudential 
fuddy-duddy, this author wishes that the New Jersey Supreme 
Court would have proceeded with more caution. At the very least, 
one would have expected a more sustained exploration of the intent 
of the enacting legislature rather than an opportunistic seizing upon 
the words of the statute when dealing with an insurance product 
(WCIEL coverage packages) historically identified with the bodily 
injury of smashed toes rather than the newer, more controversial 
bodily injury of physical manifestation of emotional trauma due to 
sexual harassment. Similarly, one might have hoped for a more so­
phisticated analysis of public policy than the abrupt conclusion that, 
because the purpose of the workers' compensation statutory 
scheme was protection of workers from traditional bodily injury, 
latter-day developments in the law. of employment claims must be 
subject to this same public policy regime.128 
126. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
127. See id. at 65. 
128. One can, of course, make a strong case that statutory meaning evolves over 
time and that courts should even embrace the task of "updating" legislation. See e.g., 
WILUAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994) (outlining 
such an approach, defending its legitimacy, and discussing its application). This view is 
of course controversial in many quarters. See, e.g., John Copeland Nagle, Newt Ging­
rich: Dynamic Statutory Interpreter, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2209 (1995) (book review) 
(criticizing the author's approach as too unsettling and creating the potential for parti­
san opportunism). I actually support so-called "dynamic" statutory interpretation if it is 
not excessive in degree. However, Schmidt v. Smith did not undertake a thorough and 
nuanced dynamic statutory analysis. It simply read the statutory language with formal­
istic literal breadth. 
1999] PUBLIC POLICY IN EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES LIABILITY 319 

Rather than making this leap, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
should have recognized that employment discrimination claims, 
particularly sexual harassment claims, are in an evolving state, as is 
the response of employers and insurers to such claims. As a result, 
some patience in allowing private actors to develop a market re­
sponse and to permit the state's legislative and executive officials to 
determine if, as a matter of policy, the market's response to the 
problem is sufficient is in order. By imposing coverage as a matter 
of law, notwithstanding the insurer's clear exclusionary language, 
the Schmidt court shifted the political landscape in favor of man­
dated coverage, and may have truncated the evolution of public 
policy in this area altogether. For example, had the Schmidt court 
refrained from imposing coverage, other actors in New Jersey gov­
ernment, politics, and society would have been required to address 
the issue, debating and deciding the question of whether to specifi­
cally include discrimination claims within required EL coverage. 
The legislature and executive branches may have established a spe­
cial regime for discrimination coverage. They still might. 
But because of Schmidt v. Smith,129 the status quo has been 
changed from one where the insuring agreement controls to one of 
mandated coverage. If the new mandated coverage status quo is to 
change, those seeking to change it will need to overcome the bur­. . 
dens of inertia. This means overcoming interest groups that have 
something to protect in the Schmidt ruling, as well as overcoming 
the ordinary inertia of placing workers' compensation statutory re­
form on the legislative and regulatory agenda, processing it, educat­
ing political actors, persuading them, forcing a vote, and so on. 
In effect, Schmidt has made the public policy "playing field" 
uneven. Those who think that discrimination risk management 
should be dealt with outside of ordinary workers' compensation law 
now bear the burden of effecting political change. Because employ­
ers and insurers are powerful interest groups, they may well be able 
to shoulder the burden, although this is by no means clear. It is, of 
course, not at all apparent whether employers and insurers are suf­
ficiently united to effect revision of the impact of Schmidt. For ex­
ample, employers may regard the decision as one worth protecting, 
even at the expense of spending political capital to fend off insur­
ance industry attempts to legislatively overrule Schmidt, which one 
certainly expects. However, if EL premiums increase substantially, 
employers may join insurers in seeking to decouple discrimination 
129. 713 A.2d 1014 (N.J. 1998). 
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coverage from EL insurance, unless desired discrimination cover­
age becomes more expensive when purchased through a separate 
EPL policy,130 
The one thing that seems safe to assume is that no one can 
even begin to predict the impact of Schmidt. As discussed above, 
there is no certainty as to what New Jersey's reaction to the deci­
sion will be. The statute may stand unchanged, or it may be modi­
fied in reaction to the decision. An overruling by the court itself is 
unlikely, at least in the foreseeable future, in view of the court's 
unanimous decision. To date, despite the interest the decision has 
drawn in the insurance trade press and scholarly journals, there ap­
pears to be no concerted political activity in response to Schmidt. 
Outside of New Jersey, there is no evidence that other courts are on 
the brink of either emulating or rejecting Schmidt. There does not 
yet appear to be any cases pending in other states that would 
prompt other courts to consider the issue, even though most state 
workers' compensation laws contain language similar to the New 
Jersey statute at issue in Schmidt.131 
Because Schmidt creates something of a tabula rasa on the is­
sue of whether bodily injury from discrimination is a mandated cov­
erage under state workers' compensation systems, the question 
remains: does an arguably incorrect interpretation and decision 
nonetheless create a better workers' compensation insurance sys­
tem? In the wake of Schmidt, New Jersey EL carriers will presuma­
bly rewrite their policies to specifically include discrimination and 
harassment claims or will require that employers purchase EPL in­
surance as a condition of purchasing workers' compensation and 
EL insurance. In any event, one expects insurers to collect a pre­
mium for providing this coverage, which now must be provided 
under state law if an insurer is to write EL coverage at all. Only by 
130. At this juncture, the financial impact of Schmidt v. Smith remains unclear. 
According to one regulator, "making predictions of skyrocketing premium rates [is] a 
matter of speculation." See Sclafane, supra note 2, at 16. In fact, one insurer attorney, 
while admitting that he could not predict the number of discrimination claims in the 
offing, concluded that the average cost of each such claim was likely to be high, exerting 
upward pressure on WClEL insurance rates. However," '[g]iven what the Supreme 
Court decided, insurers can't rewrite the exclusion,'" which suggests that any increased 
costs will inevitably be passed along to employers. See id. (quoting insurer attorney 
Kevin Fitzgerald); see also McGonigle, supra note 2, at 100. 
131. However, "[l]awyers who were interviewed felt the decision would not apply 
outside New Jersey." Sclafane, supra note 2, at 16. Presumably, counsel meant that the 
decision would not have extraterritorial effect on the non-New Jersey operations of 
New Jersey-based employers. They may also have meant that the Schmidt decision, for 
the reasons discussed in this Article, is unlikely to be emulated in other states. 
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refusing to be an EL insurer can the carrier avoid the mandated 
discrimination coverage of Schmidt. 
In the wake of Schmidt, however, insurers retain considerable 
latitude regarding insurance products and coverage. For example, 
an EL insurer could closely track the Schmidt court's interpretation 
of the statute and'restrict its discrimination insurance to claims 
where bodily injury is alleged. In a similar fashion, the EL insurer 
could presumably place more stringent reporting requirements or 
triggering criteria on its EL policies. Also, more aggressive exclu­
sions for discrimination claims could be utilized, but these would 
most likely be ineffective in light of the broad mandate for coverage 
the court found imposed by statute in Schmidt. EL and related in­
surers may thus embrace Schmidt and offer expansive coverage, but 
charge for it. In the alternative, EL insurers might attempt to limit 
their discrimination coverage to the extent permitted by Schmidt 
and subsequent decisions enforcing Schmidt. 
This evolving world of WCIELIEPL packages for employers 
will presumably be more expensive, but will also be more compre­
hensive, unless insurers adopt a very grudging reaction to Schmidt. 
Employers will presumably desire to continue to purchase work­
place liability insurance as before, but now they will need to pay for 
the discrimination coverage. Functionally, this expands the pool of 
policyholders in New Jersey holding employment discrimination in­
surance. With this larger risk pool, insurers may be able to more 
quickly acquire the underwriting and actuarial expertise to offer 
broad discrimination claims coverage at more reasonable rates. 
If this occurs, Schmidt v. Smith may prove to be a most satis­
factory decision despite its analytic flaws and activist bent. The 
court may succeed to a degree in "technology forcing" by mandat­
ing this type of coverage for employers through the EL policy, just 
as pollution standards are viewed by many as helping to force in­
dustries to develop better technology for controlling air emissions 
and wastewater discharges. 
It would be useful for society if discrimination claims were sub­
jected to more widespread insurance coverage: employers would 
have greater protection; employees would have reduced risk of in­
adequate compensation due to employer insolvency or impoverish­
ment; and insurers would make money, creating economic growth 
(so would lawyers, but that in itself is not a reason to oppose an 
otherwise useful development). Presumably, the incidence of dis­
crimination and harassment over time will decline, not only because 
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of the deterrent value of discrimination litigation (which is present 
even without insurance), but also because of the presence of insur­
ance underwriting. 
Insurers, of course, hope to profit from writing coverage. In­
surers that write discrimination coverage may prove adept at 
screening risks and counseling policyholders in order to reduce the 
incidence of discrimination claims. Applicants turned down for 
EPL coverage or the blended WCIELIEPL coverage, which this au­
thor expects will emerge in the wake of Schmidt, must respond by 
improving personnel policies in order to qualify for coverage. Poli­
cyholders will presumably listen to insurer instructions for avoiding 
or minimizing claims. 
In short, it is possible that Schmidt will prompt substantially 
expanded insurance coverage for discrimination claims, giving 
workers enhanced protection, and spurring growth in this segment 
of the insurance industry. It is also possible that the net impact of 
Schmidt will be to increase insurance premiums for employers or to 
force some insurers out of the New Jersey market with no signifi­
cant expansion in the availability of discrimination coverage. 
Rather than hope for the best in the wake of a disruptive decision, 
this author suggests that the Schmidt court should have allowed the 
evolutionary process of the political system to take place without 
the judicial compulsion occasioned by the decision. 
CONCLUSION 
Close attention to text is a useful trait in the law, whether the 
text is a constitution, statute, or contract. Also important is atten­
tion to the intent of the contracting parties, the purpose of the in­
strument, the expectations of the parties, and the larger sphere of 
public policy goals attending legislation and governing private eco~ 
nomic conduct. When courts embrace either textual or nontextual 
interpretative factors to the exclusion of the other, the resulting ju­
dicial analysis is suspect and potentially detrimental to both the 
legal system and to its participants. Ordinary contract construction 
methodology should be displaced by public policy fiat only in clear 
cases. Schmidt arguably breached this axiom. Although the even;' 
tual impact of Schmidt may well be positive, its methodology 
should not be emulated. 
